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Too Much Too Soon? A Case for Hesitancy in the Passage 
of State and Federal Password Protection Laws 
Megan Davis* 
INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2012, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley signed into law the 
nation’s first employee social media privacy protection law banning employers 
from requiring applicants and employees to provide them with login information to 
their social media accounts as a term of receiving or keeping employment.1 Since 
then, twelve other states have followed Maryland’s lead and either enacted or 
initiated the process of enacting some form of law aimed at prohibiting employers 
from gaining access to a candidate’s private social media information.2 
These actions come after widespread public outrage at personal stories of 
employers requesting and/or requiring unlimited access to applicants’ and 
employees’ social media accounts, including information kept private such as 
Facebook’s private messaging service.3 In a press release on the subject, Senator 
Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) said,  
I am alarmed and outraged by rapidly and widely 
spreading employer practices seeking access to 
Facebook passwords or confidential information on 
other social networks. A ban on these practices is 
                                                          
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Class of 2015, at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The 
author would like to thank everyone on the staff and editorial board of the Pittsburgh Journal of 
Technology Law and Policy for their support throughout the writing process. Special thanks to Kevin 
Leary, Elizabeth Orton, Chris Schlag, and Kevin Rogers for their guidance and insightful critique. 
Finally, the author would like to thank her friends and family, all of whom have been instrumental to her 
success on the Journal and in all aspects of her law school career. 
1 Melissa Coretz Goemann, Maryland Passes Nation’s First Social Media Privacy Protection 
Bill, ACLU (May 4, 2012, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/maryland-
passes-nations-first-social-media-privacy-protection-bill. 
2 See Michelle Poore, Law & Informatics Symposium on Labor and Employment Issues: Article: 
A Call for Uncle Sam to Get Big Brother Out of Our Knickers: Protecting Privacy and Freedom of 
Speech Interests in Social Media Accounts, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 507, 508 (2013). 
3 See Goemann, supra note 1. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIV – Spring 2014 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.142 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
necessary to stop unreasonable and unacceptable 
invasions of privacy.4 
The practice of asking employees and potential employees for social media 
login information, when implemented, raises a variety of complex legal issues. 
State and federal lawmakers have jumped at the opportunity to disparage the 
exercise; at the time of publication of this note, the Social Networking Online 
Protection Act (“SNOPA”) has been referred to a Congressional committee to 
determine the appropriateness of introducing the bill into Congress.5 At the state 
level, twenty-six states have implemented or have introduced legislation that would 
ban or regulate the practice.6 
Despite this national indignation, the extent of this legislative frenzy is both 
unwarranted and dangerous given the general lack of reliable information available. 
The proper balance between legitimate employer needs and an applicant’s or 
employee’s right to privacy and equal protection is unclear and is not a question 
that should be answered through rushed legislation. It is important to note that in 
addition to the wide variance in protections offered in the state statutes that have 
already been enacted, which can lead to confusion amongst employers and 
employees regarding legal rights and responsibilities, a number of legal remedies 
are already available to protect privacy interests in social media content.7 
Additionally, even though determining exactly what conduct should be outlawed 
seems like a simple task, in practice it can be extremely arduous. While banning 
employers from requiring usernames and passwords may be a fairly straightforward 
objective, an employer’s cyber-vetting of hopeful employees can take on other, 
more nebulous forms. For example, when is it unlawful for an employer to examine 
an applicant’s Facebook page? Only while in his or her presence? When is it 
acceptable for an employer to “friend” an applicant prior to making an employment 
decision? Or for an employer to use a third-party application in conducting social 
media checks? The practical difficulties associated with creating an effective social 
                                                          
4 Blumenthal, Schumer: Employer Demands for Facebook and Email Passwords as Precondition 
for Job Interviews May Be a Violation of Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds to Investigate (Mar. 26, 
2012), http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=336396. 
5 See H.R. 537: Social Networking Online Protection Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/113/hr537#overview (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (noting that after the Bill was introduced 
on February 6, 2016, it progressed through to the reference committee). 
6 See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ 
employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last modified Feb. 21, 2014) (providing 
descriptions of the various state password protection laws and their status). 
7 See discussion infra Part III. 
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media protection law manifest themselves in the vast differences in protection 
allowed under the various state laws currently in place. While some of these laws 
provide a liberal amount of protection for hopeful employees, others provide only a 
bare minimum.8 
The purpose of this note is to advocate for a more hesitant legislative stance 
toward social media password protection laws in an effort to avoid unnecessarily 
over-legislating in an area of privacy law that is still developing. While an outright 
rejection of such legislation is not intended, the speed and political vigor with 
which lawmakers are moving forward with such statutes raises the risk of statutory 
ambiguity, confusion amongst affected parties, and unnecessary burdens on 
employers, not to mention one more concern for lawmakers who are busy drafting 
legislation to deal with other equally important societal issues. Part I of this note 
outlines the various reports identifying the trend in employers asking for social 
media login information, in an effort to discern how widespread the practice 
actually is, as well as what form these requests take. Part II provides an analysis of 
the current legal regime, which includes the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 
the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), employee protections under the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
prohibitions, and the constitutional protection provided by the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. Part II will also show the strengths and weaknesses each 
of these protections provide and highlight some of the functional limitations of 
each. Part II concludes that the current legal regime is sufficient to protect against 
some, but not all, of the problems password protection laws seek to remedy, 
thereby making many of these laws redundant, time-consuming, and unnecessary. 
Part III outlines the practical difficulties in drafting a sufficiently narrowly tailored 
social media privacy law, including disparities in the statutes of those states that 
have chosen to enact laws safeguarding private social media accounts and defining 
appropriate exceptions for legitimate employer interests, such as investigating 
harassment claims and avoiding liability under negligent hire laws. 
I. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE ISSUE: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT 
WE DON’T 
The debate regarding social media password protection began in 2011 when 
Mr. Robert Collins contacted the ACLU of Maryland, outraged by the fact that he 
had been required to hand over his Facebook password and username in order to 
                                                          
8 Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 6. 
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reapply for a job with the Maryland Department of Corrections.9 As more 
individuals came forward confirming Collins’ statement with their own personal 
stories, privacy advocates from across the country began to vocalize their 
opposition to the practice.10 
Potential employees are often warned about the dangers of posting 
controversial content on social media sites and therefore should know the risk that 
a potential employer might see that publicly available information.11 Studies are 
inconclusive on exactly how frequently public content is accessed in making hiring 
decisions. For example, one survey indicates that forty-five percent of employers 
access public social media content when making hiring decisions,12 while another 
study indicates that the number may be closer to seventy-five percent.13 No matter 
what the percentage, the fact remains that any content posted to a public social 
media account can be accessed by just about anyone, including potential 
employers.14 
The issue of how many employers actually require login information in order 
to access private information is not nearly as well researched. Out of the few 
reputable studies available, only one study conducted by the Associated Press 
actually pointed to one unnamed private company that required at least one 
applicant to provide it with a Facebook password.15 Outside of that, there was little 
evidence that this is a common practice in the private employment sphere.16 That 
being said, there were a few instances of private employers using less invasive, but 
still questionable, techniques such as having an applicant log in to their social 
media profiles in the presence of an interviewer or asking the applicant to “friend” 
                                                          
9 See Goemann, supra note 1. 
10 Id. 
11 See Poore, supra note 2. 
12 Rosemary Haefner, More Employers Screening Candidates via Social Networking Sites, 
CAREERBUILDER, http://www.careerbuilder.com/Article/CB-1337-Getting-Hired-More-Employers-
Screening-Candidates-via-Social-Networking-Sites/?ArticleID=1337 (last modified June 10, 2009). 
13 Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2011, 
12:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/social-media-history-becomes-a-new-job-
hurdle.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
14 See Poore, supra note 2. 
15 The Associated Press, Senators Question Employer Requests for Facebook Passwords, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, 12:00 AM, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/technology/senators-want-
employers-facebook-password-requests-reviewed.html. 
16 Matthew Kauffman, Claim Check: Employers Asking for Facebook Passwords, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Mar. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://courantblogs.com/investigative-reporting/claim-check-
employers-asking-for-facebook-passwords/. 
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the interviewer.17 All other examples came from the public employment sphere in 
primarily the area of law enforcement where invasive background checks involving 
psychological examinations are a common practice.18 The authors of the 
Associated Press study never purported to claim that the practice is widespread, nor 
did they claim that the practice is growing in popularity.19 
The general lack of information available to support the rush towards 
increased privacy legislation should at the very least cause some hesitancy amongst 
lawmakers and potentially affected parties regarding the necessity of these 
legislative efforts. When added to the established protections afforded by other 
laws already in place, the reasons for this skepticism become more apparent. 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME 
As is historically common, the legal sphere has yet to catch up to the 
technological advances of recent years, and social media is no exception.20 Many of 
the laws that are currently utilized in cases regarding misuse of social media sites 
and profiles were drafted well before the advent of modern social media.21 This 
does not mean, however, that those whose rights have been violated in some way 
are left completely without redress. 
A. Anti-Discrimination Laws 
While employers in many states are not currently outlawed from requesting 
an employee’s social media login information, those employers are prohibited from 
discriminating against employees based on much of the information their social 
media pages provide.22 One area that provides a breeding ground for potential 
litigation when social media becomes involved is the potential employee 
background check.23 
                                                          
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Michelle Scheinman, Labor: Chapter 618: Cyberfrontier: New Guidelines for Employers 
Regarding Employee Social Media, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 732 (2013). 
21 See discussion infra pts. III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), and III(e). 
22 Megan Whitehill, Comment, Better Safe Than Subjective: The Problematic Intersection of Pre-
Hire Social Networking Checks and Title VII Employment Discrimination, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 229, 232 
(2012). 
23 Id. 
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While background checks on potential employees are nothing new, the cyber-
vetting trend that has emerged in recent years differs substantially from more 
traditional practices.24 Traditionally, background checks consisted of a screening of 
criminal records, credit scores, civil judgments against the candidate, and other 
officially determined criteria, the analysis of which does not involve a great deal of 
subjectivity.25 These factors can also easily be challenged should an applicant feel 
that their background check was inaccurate.26 Social media checks, on the other 
hand, necessarily require an employer to evaluate private information that can 
easily be taken out of context or misunderstood.27 With no official determination or 
explanation of the information an employer might find on a social media account, 
employers are free to utilize a great deal of subjectivity in determining whether 
such fragmented information indicates how well the employee would fit within the 
organization.28 
The subjectivity inherent in cyber-vetting practices creates a variety of legal 
risks for employers, especially when it comes to determining if a Title VII hiring 
discrimination has taken place.29 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it 
illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”30 It is Title VII that prevents an 
employer from asking questions related to an applicant’s protected status during a 
job interview or seeking out information that would help an employer determine if 
the applicant did in fact fall into such a class.31 An employer can avoid liability 
under Title VII if it can prove it had no knowledge of the applicant’s status as a 
member of a protected class.32 
In proving a Title VII discrimination claim, an affected potential employee 
must show that he or she was within a protected class, was qualified for the 
                                                          
24 Dr. Shaby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy 
Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 
554 (2013). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Ghoshray, supra note 24, at 562. 
28 Id. 
29 Whitehill, supra note 22, at 253. 
30 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (2012). 
31 Whitehill, supra note 22, at 229, 253. 
32 Id. at 252. 
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position, met the employer’s legitimate performance expectations, was adversely 
affected, and the evidence presented is sufficient to give rise to an inference of 
discrimination.33 Discriminatory intent need not be the sole reason behind a 
decision not to offer a particular applicant a position because the United States’ 
Supreme Court has recognized a mixed-motive claim for discrimination, which 
holds that an employer may not consider any protected factors in making an 
employment decision.34 This is true even if the protected trait was considered 
alongside legitimate factors and even if the ultimate determination would have 
been the same had the protected trait not been considered.35 
A determination that the evidence on record is sufficient to support an 
inference of discrimination is most often shown through the introduction of 
circumstantial evidence.36 One piece of evidence that is often considered is the 
amount of subjectivity allowed in the hiring process.37 While it is not unlawful to 
use subjective practices in hiring determinations per se, the greater the level of 
subjectivity utilized in a company’s hiring processes, the more likely a court will 
find that discrimination has taken place.38 
Limiting the level of subjectivity that takes place during hiring procedures is 
not an easy task, but if an employer is truly dedicated to avoiding discrimination 
litigation, there are a few practices these employers can and will likely implement 
to show their dedication to objective hiring. First, employers can implement 
practices that create exposure control.39 Exposure control mechanisms seek to 
prevent those in charge of hiring from coming across information that could 
potentially expose an applicant’s protected status by limiting the information such 
hiring managers receive during the interview process.40 For example, hiring 
managers could be required to decide which applicants to interview based solely on 
the content of resume submissions, with no additional background checks or 
                                                          
33 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). 
34 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). 
35 Id. 
36 Whitehill, supra note 22, at 239, 242–43. 
37 Id. at 243.  
38 Turner v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009). 
39 Whitehill, supra note 22, at 257. 
40 Id. 
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investigations.41 The less likely an employer is to know about an applicant’s 
protected trait, the less likely that employer will become subject to litigation.42 
Second, subjectivity can be limited by implementing a process for exclusively 
objective evaluations.43 Exclusively objective evaluations require that hiring 
managers base their decisions solely on objectively determinable factors, such as 
grade point average, years of experience in the field, etc.44 Such practices take the 
power away from those in charge of hiring and eliminate the opportunity for any 
improper biases to enter the realm of hiring decisions.45 
The practice of cyber-vetting raises some obvious explicit and implicit 
discrimination issues. Social media accounts, whether they have been made private 
or public, often contain information that would identify an applicant as a member 
of a protected class, such as religious affiliation, gender, and/or race.46 When an 
employer makes the choice to access an applicant’s social media accounts, it rids 
itself of any ignorance of the applicant’s status. Consequently, if an employment 
discrimination claim arises, the employer can no longer avoid liability by claiming 
it had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected status.47 
Additionally, as noted earlier, the practice of choosing applicants based on 
information from their social media profiles is highly subjective in nature. While 
such subjectivity is not necessarily illegal, the lack of any objective standards for 
reviewing such information is highly suspect and creates a significant risk of 
heightened scrutiny for employers in terms of discrimination litigation.48 The desire 
to avoid a costly and publicity-ridden litigation process can prevent employers 
from choosing applicants based on what they post on social media profiles, either 
for public consumption or for private viewing, due to their knowledge that there is 
no objective criteria with which to analyze such information. The significance of 
this deterrence should not be overlooked in analyzing the current state of social 
media privacy protections. 
                                                          
41 Id. at 258. 
42 Id. at 260. 
43 Id. at 257. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Whitehill, supra note 22, at 254. 
47 Id. at 253. 
48 Id. at 252. 
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B. The Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), a subset of the broader Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), criminalizes “intentional, unauthorized 
access to stored electronic communications held by an electronic communication 
service [and] . . . prohibits electronic communication services providers and remote 
computing services providers from disclosing user communication.”49 For the 
purposes of the SCA, an “electronic communication” means any transfer of data, 
such as text or images that occur via wire, radio or electronic system,50 and an 
“electronic communications service” is a service that provides users the ability to 
send and receive electronic communications.51 Section 2701 of the SCA, the 
section at issue for the purposes of this note, does not differentiate between public 
and private information.52 It does, on the other hand, differentiate between 
“authorized” and “unauthorized” access to electronic communications, as 
authorization acts as a defense to a claim for violation of the SCA.53 
There has been some question as to whether or not a law enacted in 1986 
could adequately protect the privacy rights unique to more modern social media 
sites; after all, at the time of its enactment, the concept of social media as it is 
known today surely was not on the minds of those who drafted the law.54 While the 
Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, two recent federal district court 
decisions have held that the SCA does in fact apply to unauthorized access to 
private social media accounts, thereby opening the door to further discussion on the 
merits of utilizing this law in the context of employee social media use.55 
In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp., the District Court of 
New Jersey found that the SCA protects a Facebook user’s private pages (i.e. pages 
only visible to “friends”).56 The court in this case was called upon to decide if an 
                                                          
49 The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
50 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
51 Id. at § 2510(17). 
52 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 
53 Id. at § 2701(c). 
54 Todd C. Taylor, Social Media and the Stored Communications Act: Does a 1986 Law Protect 
Timelines and Tweets?, BLOOMBERG SOCIAL MEDIA LAW & POLICY REPORTS (Nov. 26, 2013), 
available at http://www.mvalaw.com/assets/attachments/Taylor%20Todd_Bloomberg%20BNA_ 
Social%20Media%20SCA_11.26.13.pdf. 
55 Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp., No. 2:11-cv-03305, 2013 BL 220816 
(D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
56 Ehling, 2013 BL 220816, at *7. 
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employee, Ms. Ehling, had been temporarily suspended from her employment 
improperly when her employer was alerted to postings on her Facebook wall that 
were only visible to her Facebook friends, but which the employer deemed 
inappropriate.57 The employer learned about these postings from another employee 
of the organization that also happened to be Ms. Ehling’s Facebook friend.58 In 
deciding that Ms. Ehling’s employer had accessed her postings in violation of the 
SCA, the court held that Facebook posts constitute “electronic communications” 
within the statutory definition as they involve sending data from a computing 
device to Facebook’s servers, and that Facebook constitutes an “electronic 
communication service” because it’s main purpose is to allow people to transmit 
and share data on its servers via the Internet and posts are stored indefinitely for 
archiving purposes.59 
Even though the court did not find in Ms. Ehling’s favor because her 
employer accessed the information through an unsolicited showing from one of her 
Facebook friends (i.e. someone with proper authorization to access the content),60 
the Court’s finding shows that the SCA can be tailored and/or interpreted to protect 
private social media content through an analysis of the term “authorized.” If an 
employee or applicant can prove that the action of handing over his or her login 
information was somehow coerced or was otherwise an involuntary act, then the 
employer could not claim authority as a defense to liability under the SCA.61 
In the case of Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the Court gave some 
clarification on the proper ways to use the SCA to protect against employer access 
to social media content.62 While factually dissimilar to Ehling in a number of ways, 
the court in Crispin utilized much of the same reasoning in its determination.63 In 
determining whether subpoenas requiring social media sites, including Facebook 
and MySpace, should hand over comments made by one of their users, the District 
Court for the Central District of California again found that social media sites of 
this nature qualify as electronic communications services providers under the 
                                                          
57 Id. at *3. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at *7. 
60 Id. at *9. 
61 Blumenthal, Schumer, supra note 4 (stating that “Requiring applicants to provide login 
credentials to secure social media websites and then using those credentials to access private 
information stored on those sites may be unduly coercive and therefore constitute unauthorized 
access.”). 
62 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
63 Id. at 982–89. 
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SCA.64 The court also found that private postings and messages on these sites 
constitute electronic communications that are stored for backup and archival 
purposes, thus allowing them to fall under the SCA’s protection.65 The subpoenas 
requesting these private messages were subsequently squashed.66 
While the Supreme Court has yet to officially adopt the SCA as a protection 
against unwelcome employer access to private social media content, this case 
highlights the Act’s potential. Not only does it show a judicial recognition of the 
need for privacy in certain types of social media content, but it also highlights the 
distinct qualities of social media that allow it to fall under the SCA’s protection. 
Considerations of the SCA’s relationship to social media are still developing, but 
based on the outcomes of these cases, it is not unreasonable to believe that courts 
may soon find the SCA provides protections that adequately address the concerns 
proposed password protection laws seek to remedy. 
C. The National Labor Relations Act 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) protects employees 
from adverse employment actions taken in response to engagement in “concerted 
activities” with other employees.67 While the NLRA does not define concerted 
activity within the statute, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has stated 
that it considers concerted activity to be present when an employee acts with or on 
behalf of other employees, and not solely for himself or herself, for the purpose of 
discussing shared concerns about the terms and conditions of employment, even if 
no action is taken beyond that discussion.68 The practical difficulty with this 
definition is that it is subject to interpretation and has not created a bright-line rule 
for determining when an employee’s social media conduct has reached the level of 
protected concerted activity.69 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA outlines potential 
liability for employers who violate Section 7’s right to engage in concerted 
activity.70 
                                                          
64 Id. at 982. 
65 Id. at 989. 
66 Id. at 991. 
67 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
68 Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and Unfair 
Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 960 (2012) (citing to Advice Memorandum from the NLRB 
Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A. Overstreet, Regional Director of Region 28, Sagepoint 
Financial, Inc., No. 28-CA-23441, 2011 WL 3793672, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2011)). 
69 Id. at 994. 
70 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
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The NLRB’s concern with employer utilization of employees’ social media 
content is obvious; employer surveillance of social media conversations has the 
potential to chill employee speech and prevent employees from engaging in 
meaningful discussions related to their employment conditions.71 This aversion to 
employer surveillance does not extend to situations where an employer claims that 
it learned information through another employee, much like the reasoning the court 
employed in the Ehling case mentioned above.72 Additionally, the right to 
concerted activity cannot be claimed when the speech in question is merely a 
personal complaint regarding working conditions; there must be some sort of group 
activity involved.73 
The NLRB considers it a violation of an employee’s Section 7 rights when an 
employer’s rules and actions are reasonably likely to prevent employees from 
engaging in their right to concerted activity.74 A rule can either explicitly prohibit 
protected activity or it can implicitly prohibit protected activity if (1) employees 
would reasonably construe the language of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activities, 
(2) the rule was propagated in response to union activity, or (3) the rule has been 
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.75 
In the past few years, the NLRB has received over 100 complaints regarding 
employer action taken in conjunction with employee social media postings.76 In a 
few circumstances, where a social media post involved the conditions of an 
employee’s workplace and it garnered the attention and commentary of multiple 
employees, it was determined that adverse employment decisions were made in 
response to concerted activity on a social media site.77 For example, the NLRB 
decided in favor of a terminated employee who took to Facebook to express her 
outrage at being demoted to a lower paying position within the collections agency 
where she worked.78 Two co-workers plus several former co-workers posted 
messages of support alongside her complaint and expressed their similar sentiments 
                                                          
71 Sprague, supra note 68, at 968. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 
73 Sprague, supra note 68, at 973. 
74 Id. at 968. 
75 Id. at 968–69. 
76 Id. at 957. 
77 Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Regional Directors, 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting Gen. Counsel Concerning Social Media 
Cases, at *2 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d45807d6567. 
78 Id. at *5. 
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about their employer.79 The collective nature of this communication as well as its 
narrow content dealing solely with working conditions allowed this case to fall 
squarely within the protections of the NLRA.80 
In most cases, however, the NLRB determined the employee speech at issue 
did not constitute protected concerted activity, as it either did not engage other 
employees (i.e. it constituted a personal gripe and not an invitation for discussion), 
or it was unrelated to working conditions as a whole.81 For instance, the NLRB 
decided against an employee who was punished after posting a derogatory 
Facebook status about her employer during her lunch break.82 While a few of her 
coworkers “liked” the status update, the NLRB held that this was insufficient to 
prove incitement of group discussion or action.83 
These NLRB decisions, along with the many others that accompany them, 
show that while the NLRA is applicable to claims for employer misuse of private 
social media content, there is also an important functional limitation of its use; the 
protection provided is specific to the content of the speech at issue.84 Only 
conversations that fall within the confines of the Act’s narrow provisions will be 
granted protection.85 Standing alone, therefore, the NLRA arguably provides 
minimal protection for those who wish to keep their social media content separate 
from their work lives. 
D. The Fourth Amendment 
Since the vast majority of cases involving an employer requesting an 
employee or job applicant’s social media login information comes from employers 
in the public sphere,86 a note on Fourth Amendment protections is warranted. The 
Fourth Amendment protects private citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures performed by government agents.87 The Supreme Court has elaborated on 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection, ruling the right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures still applies even when the affected individual 
                                                          
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *7. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
85 Id. 
86 See Kauffman, supra note 16. 
87 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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is an employee of the government and the government agent is acting in its 
capacity as employer.88 This protection is somewhat lessened in employment cases 
as opposed to criminal circumstances; in the employment context, the protection 
the Fourth Amendment provides is limited to the legitimate employer need of 
providing a safe, proficient working environment and does not include protections 
such as the warrant and probable cause requirements that would be available in a 
criminal prosecution.89 
The scope of Fourth Amendment protection is governed primarily by the case 
of Katz v. United States, in which the Court determined the Amendment protects 
those who have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area being searched.90 
The test for determining when such a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
comes from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, which requires a two-step 
inquiry.91 First, the party seeking redress must prove he or she had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the place being searched.92 Once this has been proven, 
that party must also prove that he or she had an objective expectation of privacy 
that society would be willing to accept as reasonable.93 Given the fact that this test 
does not create any bright-line test for a determination of reasonableness, courts are 
often required to use their discretion in analyzing what is “reasonable” conduct 
under society’s modern expectations.94 
In addition to Katz’s reasonableness requirements, the case of O’Connor v. 
Ortega outlines additional considerations to use when determining Fourth 
Amendment violations in the employment context.95 Using the O’Connor test, the 
court looks to see if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
area being searched by the employer, following the framework established in 
Katz.96 Once this requirement has been met, the court is then called upon to 
determine if the intrusion was reasonably justified, taking into consideration factors 
                                                          
88 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987). 
89 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989). 
90 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
91 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Alexander Naito, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitutional 
Privacy Protection to Employees’ Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 849, 860 (2012). 
95 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). 
96 Id. at 715. 
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such as the extent and invasiveness of the intrusion and any legitimate government 
reasons behind the search.97 
Keeping this framework in mind, the main issue that arises when utilizing the 
Fourth Amendment becomes proving that a person’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable under the circumstances.98 Public social media content obviously does 
not meet this standard, but even information that has been placed under the strictest 
privacy settings can run into issues because of a theory called the Third Party 
Doctrine.99 Under the Third Party Doctrine, a person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information that he or she voluntarily hands over to a 
third party, regardless of whether or not the information was handed over to that 
third party in confidence.100 The definition of a “third party” can encompass just 
about any individual or organization.101 
Under a strict reading of the Third Party Doctrine, the fact that a conversation 
was held over the Internet using the services of a social media platform such as 
Facebook or Twitter would disqualify such a conversation from Fourth 
Amendment protection.102 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has yet to decide a 
Fourth Amendment case related to employer intrusion into private social media 
content, and many scholars argue that public policy dictates a change in such a 
strict interpretation of the rule.103 Therefore, while the Fourth Amendment is 
unlikely to provide much protection at the present time, the future of the Third 
Party Doctrine and its applicability to private social media content should not be 
considered set in stone. 
                                                          
97 Id. at 719. 
98 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
99 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Naito, supra note 94, at 868. 
103 Id. at 875; see also David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth 
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 
2215–16 (2009). 
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E. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
One common way employers vet potential employees is by requesting these 
employees’ credit reports in order to determine their general reliability.104 In order 
to ensure that such reports are compiled with a certain degree of accuracy, 
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).105 The FCRA applies to 
any “consumer report”106 compiled by a “consumer reporting agency.”107 Given the 
relatively broad statutory definitions for both a consumer report and a consumer 
reporting agency, a social media background check of either public or private 
content performed by an outside agency would in most circumstances be subject to 
the standards of the FCRA.108 
While it may provide relief in limited circumstances, it is important to note 
the main functional limitation of utilizing the FCRA in an action against an 
employer for invasion into private social media content; the FCRA only applies to 
third-party vetting of social media content.109 The Act does not purport to regulate 
review of social media sites by internal members of an organization.110 It is 
therefore easy for an employer to circumvent this protection by choosing to 
perform an unofficial review of social media content without the help of an 
established outside background-checking agency.111 
Despite this major setback, utilization of the FCRA in cases involving 
intrusion into private social media content may not be completely devoid of value. 
Starting in 2010, some companies have begun utilizing third party vetting 
                                                          
104 Nathan J. Ebnet, Note, It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social 
Media Pre-Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306, 312 
(2012). 
105 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1681 (2012). 
106 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012) (defines a “consumer report” as “Any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s . . . 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be 
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s 
eligibility for . . . employment purposes.”). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f) (2012) (defines a “consumer reporting agency” as any entity that 
“regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 
parties.”). 
108 Ebnet, supra note 104, at 307. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
110 Id. 
111 Ebnet, supra note 104, at 308. 
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companies that specialize in social media.112 While the cost and logistical 
difficulties of utilizing a third party for social media background checks still weigh 
heavily on employers, the benefits of third party social media screening are slowly 
gaining traction.113 These third party professionals remove any irrelevant 
information or evidence of a protected Title VII trait from their final reports, 
thereby significantly limiting an employer’s risk of liability.114 The FCRA’s 
effectiveness in protecting private social media content will likely turn on the 
development of these third party agencies. 
III. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN DRAFTING A SUFFICIENTLY TAILORED 
PASSWORD PRIVACY LAW 
There are a number of practical issues that arise in the process of drafting 
password protection legislation. First, such legislation is inherently employee-
friendly. Therefore, it is important to remember when drafting such laws they 
should not be so overly broad as to completely ignore legitimate business interests 
that employers may have, such as investigating harassment claims and avoiding 
liability for negligent hiring, especially in circumstances where the job in question 
requires a great deal of public trust. 
Second, and related to the first issue, there is the question of what activity 
counts toward an employer coercing private information from an employee. While 
explicitly forcing an employee or applicant to provide login information for their 
social media accounts may seem like obvious coercion, other activities fall into a 
gray area. For example, is it coercive to request but not require an employee or 
applicant to provide an employer with login information? To “friend request” an 
employee or applicant on social media sites? To ask an employee or applicant to 
log in to his or her social media account in the presence of the employer? These 
questions can lead to ambiguity in the final draft of a password protection law, 
making it confusing for employers to understand their limitations and for 
employees and applicants to understand their rights. 
A. Legitimate Business Interests 
While intrusion into an employee’s privacy is rarely a pleasant experience, it 
is oftentimes warranted due to legitimate business interests. Employers can have a 
                                                          
112 Id. 
113 See SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://www.socialintel.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
114 Id. 
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number of concerns that require greater intrusion into the social media lives of their 
employees or potential employees. 
One such area of law that creates a possibility of liability is the doctrine of 
negligent hiring.115 Liability for negligent hiring arises when an employee of an 
organization commits a tort, and it can be proven that the employer breached its 
duty to use reasonable care in determining that the employee was competent when 
it made the decision to hire him or her.116 In this context, the “reasonable care” 
requirement warns that if a reasonable investigation would have uncovered an 
employee or potential employee’s dangerous characteristics, then the employer 
faces liability.117 Therefore, businesses have a legitimate interest in ensuring the 
people they hire and the employees they maintain do not possess any characteristics 
that would render them unfit for their position and dangerous to other people.118 
Employers are well aware that the increase in social media usage amongst 
employees creates greater potential for workplace harassment.119 Nowadays, not 
only can coworkers harass an employee within the confines of the business setting, 
they can also seek that employee out online.120 Not only can this create an 
inefficient and hostile working environment, there is also the possibility of 
employer liability if the employer knew or reasonably should have known that 
harassment was taking place and did nothing to correct it.121 Therefore, access to 
private social media content may be necessary in order to fully investigate claims 
of such behavior, to monitor inter-office communications for inappropriate 
statements, and to ensure that the employer is putting in a reasonable amount of 
care in seeking to prevent harassment disputes.122 
Especially in the public sector, employers also have reason to be concerned 
about the dissemination of information gained as a result of an employment 
relationship.123 While the result of leaked confidential information in the private 
                                                          
115 Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982). 
116 Id. 
117 Mark Minuti, Note, Employer Liability Under the Doctrine of Negligent Hiring: Suggested 
Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 501, 502 (1988). 
118 Id. 
119 Naito, supra note 94, at 862. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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sector may result in monetary damages of varying degrees, confidential 
information in the public sector often covers issues of public welfare and safety.124 
Allowing employee access to this type of information carries with it an obvious 
burden to ensure that such information does not become a societal detriment, and 
thus it is imperative that it not be released to the general public, either through a 
public social media posting or a private message to a friend.125 The legitimacy and 
persuasiveness of this business interest will therefore depend on the job at issue in 
each case, but it remains a genuine concern in all employment situations where 
confidential information may be present. 
B. What Provisions Should Be Included? 
The disparities in protections provided by the various state laws now in place, 
or being considered, demonstrate how many considerations need to take place 
when determining the appropriate provisions to include in a well-drafted law. For 
instance, some laws only outlaw requesting or requiring passwords for personal 
social media accounts,126 whereas others go further and prohibit employers from 
viewing password-protected material in the presence of the employee or 
applicant.127 These differences can create confusion for employers as far as what 
they are and are not allowed to do, opening them up to liability should they fail to 
adequately research the laws of the various states in which they conduct business. 
The wording of the statute is also important. Some statutes go so far as to 
prohibit employers from “demanding access in any manner” to an employee or 
applicant’s private social media content, raising the question of whether or not a 
friend request from a supervisor would be appropriate under a strict reading of the 
statute.128 Others are arguably less restrictive, prohibiting an employer from 
requesting that it be “allowed observation of” private social media content, but still 
raise the issue of statutory ambiguity.129 Again, ambiguity in statutory language can 
create confusion amongst employers who wish to utilize social media checks to the 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 Naito, supra note 94, at 862. 
126 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013); see also MD. CODE ANN., Lab. & Empl. 3-712 (West 
2013). 
127 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2012); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 8102 (2012). 
128 Assemb. B. 2879, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/ 
A3000/2879_I1.HTM. 
129 Internet Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 5523, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012), available at 
https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/publicact/pdf/2012-PA-0478.pdf. 
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fullest extent allowable under the law, raising the risk of liability should these 
employers fail to interpret such language correctly. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While password protection legislation is not necessarily a detriment to the 
employment landscape, the current rush towards legislation is based on inadequate 
information as to the prevalence of questionable behavior and a less than thorough 
analysis of the protections that are already in place. By allowing our understanding 
of social media use in employment settings to develop further, we cut the risk of 
poorly drafted legislation that creates undue burdens on businesses, confuses 
affected parties, and wastes legislators’ time and efforts. Hesitancy and a healthy 
amount of skepticism towards such laws will ensure that should sufficient evidence 
arise dictating a need for protections, the legislation that comes forth will be well 
informed, well-reasoned, and tailored to the issues at hand. 
